The stock market reaction around the announcement date of actual share repurchases, the factors that affect the size of that reaction, and the motives behind share acquisitions are examined. A unique, hand-collected dataset is used, including public announcements of companies traded on the Athens Exchange. Consistent with the price support hypothesis, companies repurchase when their share price exhibits a declining trend, whereas the short-term market reaction is not statistically significant. Large firms and firms with low book-to-market ratio repurchase when their stock has underperformed the market. Small firms and firms with high book-to-market ratio repurchase even though their shares have not experienced abnormal declines. The market reacts more favorably to buybacks by small firms and firms with high book-to-market ratio. The main variables affecting the short-term market reaction after the announcement of actual share repurchases are the book-to-market ratio, the repurchase frequency and the CAR for the period before the announcement. JEL Classification: G14, G15, G35
Introduction
Several published studies examine the motives of firms behind open-market share repurchase programs (SRPs), especially in the USA. The most popular hypothesis is that SRPs are used by companies to send a signal to the market indicating that their stock is underpriced. A partial literature includes Dann (1981) , Vermaelen (1981) , Bartov (1991) , Dann et al. (1991), Comment and Jarrell (1991) , and Lie and McConnell (1998) . 1 Company executives consider stock underpricing as one of the most important factors when deciding share repurchases (Brav et al., 2005 , Mitchell et al., 2001 and there is evidence that they time the SRP announcements to exploit the potential undervaluation (Ikenberry et al., 1995) .
Approving an SRP does not bind the firm in any way, but it allows the firm to conduct repurchases as it deems appropriate. Separately from the signaling framework, Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) view these programs as options to exchange the market value of the shares with their "true" value, thereby expanding the company's opportunity set. Apparently, such options can be valuable, depending on the managers' ability to detect and exploit the mispricing opportunities.
Two basic questions that arise are, first, to what extend the managers possess the ability to discern the discrepancy between the market stock price and the stock's "true" value, and, second, whether investors perceive the firms' repurchases as a signal of undervaluation. The fact that some programs are partially completed or are not completed at all, gives rise to criticism that the signal of the program announcement is not credible (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009 ). However, during the implementation of the program, the frequency and amount of repurchases entail a cost to the mimicking firms (Akyol and Foo, 2013) . In addition, there is a variety of value-adding choices available to management during the implementation phase of an SRP, such as market timing, price support and magnitude of repurchases, which would be useful to presumably better informed management (Cook et al., 2004) . Market timing implies that the firm repurchases at a low price compared to the subsequent non-repurchase period. Price support implies that the firm repurchases in a contrarian fashion, thus, the stock price during the repurchases is lower than it is on prior periods but not significantly different from subsequent periods (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007) . In the same spirit of adding value to the firm's shareholders, the magnitude of repurchases enhances the strength of repurchases as signals to outside investors (Zhang, 2005) .
The questions posed above are difficult to examine in the USA capital markets (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) , particularly due to the lack of timely data on actual share repurchases.
Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) report that stock buybacks in the USA do not have a standard structure, they lack typical procedures and are characterized by a relatively low degree of transparency, as they are not made public at the time they are conducted. Indeed, up to 2004, various USA studies were based either on estimates of the actual repurchases made (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) or on questionnaires that some companies answered voluntarily (Cook et al., 2004 Studies that use daily data find, among other things, that the companies buy their own shares when the share prices are on a declining path, that the managers are capable to time the markets, and that firms acquire their shares at a price lower than the average investor does (Brockman and Chung, 2001 , Zhang, 2005 , McNally et al., 2006 , Akyol and Foo, 2013 ).
The present study uses a unique database, with hand-collected data from the Greek stock market, covering the period from August 2005 to December 2010. During the period in question, companies were required to disclose publicly their daily transactions on share repurchases immediately, in no case exceeding seven trading days. The Greek legal framework provides the required transaction transparency and its capital market a rich data volume (7, 619 announcements of share repurchases are observed during the period under examination). This enables us to draw more reliable conclusions about the repurchase activity on the part of firms and about the reaction on the part of investors, hence the study's contribution to the rather thin, albeit much needed, non-USA actual-repurchases literature.
The questions addressed initially are, first, when companies choose to implement their approved SRPs, and second, how investors react when they are notified about company actions such as actual repurchases.
Next, we investigate how some company characteristics (size and book-to-market ratio) and some company choices (frequency and size of repurchases), as well as the preceding mandatory company announcement stating the reason for approving an SRP affect the behavior 5 of companies and investors. It is observed that companies whose stock is more likely to be underpriced acquire their own shares without a preceding decline in stock prices, and the reaction of investors is positive. The results are consistent with the hypothesis of signaling undervaluation. The rest of the companies acquire shares after periods in which the stock price exhibits a declining trend. After the acquisition of the shares, the stock price exhibits signs of stabilization in the short run, a fact that is in line with the hypothesis of stock price support. In addition, the stated reason for approving SRPs seems to play some role in the final market reaction. The findings of the present study are, to a great degree, in agreement with the results of other market studies, such as Zhang (2005) for Hong Kong, Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) for France, and Akyol and Foo (2013) for Australia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical framework and the hypotheses to be tested are presented in the next section. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. The empirical results are shown in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Theoretical background and development of hypotheses

The market timing hypothesis
Market timing, or managerial timing ability, is a term that refers to the issuance of new shares by a company when its stock price is at high levels and the acquisition of own shares when the stock price is at low levels. The purpose of these company actions is to exploit the current stock price fluctuations for the benefit of the long-term investors. An obvious precondition is that the market should not be characterized by strong form efficiency (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) .
A fundamental question related to stock buybacks is to what extend the executives use their private information to proceed with stock repurchases (Barclay and Smith, 1988) .
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Brockman and Chung (2001) use daily data from the Hong Kong stock market and find that executives possess a market timing ability which depends on the market conditions and the special characteristics of the firm.
Using monthly data from Japan, Ishikawa and Takahashi (2011) find that firms acquire their own shares if their stock price has followed a declining trend during the previous month, and that the stock returns of firms actually repurchasing shares exceeds the market return during the ensuing months. The results support the notion that company executives do possess the private information and/or the ability to detect when the capital market has been driven by mispricing.
The market timing hypothesis implies that the market price of the stock will be lower during the dates of conducting share repurchases in comparison to the subsequent days (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007) . The recent study by De Cesari et al. (2012) for the USA finds that indeed the companies seem to possess the ability to time the market and succeed in acquiring their own shares at a relatively low price. In addition, they find that during the month before the share acquisitions, the stock price follows a declining trend, a negative abnormal return is observed, whereas after the repurchase, a positive abnormal return is observed. The studies of Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) and Dittmar and Field (2015) find results consistent with the market timing hypothesis. 
The price support hypothesis
According to the price support hypothesis, share repurchases are conducted by a company in order to thwart a declining trend in the stock price. The main difference with the market timing hypothesis is that, a stabilization of stock prices is expected after the share repurchase, whereas in the case of the market timing hypothesis, a positive abnormal return is expected.
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) 
Company characteristics and stock repurchases
Several studies find that companies with different characteristics exhibit different behavior regarding share repurchase activities and the market reaction is also different. two stock markets, NYSE and NASDAQ, to find that the larger companies proceed to buybacks after periods in which the stock price exhibits a downward trend, whereas for the smaller companies no such result is observed.
Zhang (2005) uses daily data from Hong Kong and finds that larger companies and companies with lower book-to-market ratios conduct stock buybacks when their stock price is in a declining course. For smaller companies, as well as companies with a high book-to-market ratio, no statistically significant abnormal return is observed, during the period preceding the buyback. Moreover, for smaller companies and companies with high book-to-market ratio, the market reaction is stronger both at the announcement date and during the short-run period following the announcement.
Hypothesis 3: Companies with different characteristics repurchase their own shares under different conditions.
Hypothesis 4:
The market reaction will be different, depending on the characteristics of the companies that conduct repurchases.
Stated reasons for approving stock repurchase programs
Otchere and Ross (2002) examine a sample of announcements of SRPs for which the stated reason for their approval is share undervaluation. These announcements are treated as a positive signal by the investors and the market reacts favorably for the companies that approve SRPs.
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Such reaction is smaller, albeit positive for companies of the competition, a fact that is consistent with the undervaluation hypothesis.
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) find that at the announcement of SRP approval, the market reaction is stronger for firms that state undervaluation as the motive for the approval. Akyol and Foo (2013) use daily data from Australia and conclude that for companies which announce as a reason for initiating an SRP the fact that the stock is underpriced, the investors reaction is positive and stronger compared to the companies that announce a different reason for SRP approval. This observation holds both for the announcement date of the SRPs and for the dates of the actual repurchases. In addition, companies which mention their stock underpricing as a reason for approving repurchases eventually buy back fewer shares in relation to companies which state a different reason for SRP approval, while daily repurchases do not seem to occur as a response to the stock price trend. 
Disclosure requirements and share repurchase data
In Greece, an open market SRP must be authorized by the General Meeting. At the date of the authorization, the General Meeting defines the maximum number of shares that can be purchased, the duration of the SRP and the maximum and minimum price that can be paid. Α firm may repurchase up to 10% of the outstanding shares. On the day of the actual buyback, the repurchase price cannot be higher than the price of the last independent trade or the current 10 independent bid. The maximum daily volume of the buybacks is 25% of the average daily volume. In cases of extreme low liquidity, a firm may repurchase up to 50%, given than both the stock market authority and the investors are informed in advance, (Insert Table 1 here)
To include an announcement in the study, we require that the number of shares that are bought and the average price are reported daily. Several announcements are excluded because:
the company had preferred shares as well as common shares at the date of the SRP authorization, they contained buybacks for two to seven days but did not report the number of shares or the average price for every day separately, they were made later (not immediately) and is considered very likely that investors had already been informed by another source, such as the Internet or a newspaper. Other reasons for excluding announcements are repetition of the purchase date and incomplete information. To eliminate extreme observations, announcements that contained buybacks for more than seven trading days or are made after a reverse split (which changed significantly the number and the price of the company's traded shares) are not included in the study. Panel B of Table 2 reports the number of trading days per announcement. The announcements that report more than one repurchase day are about 23,5%
of the dataset. We proceed with the estimation of the short-term market reaction surrounding the actual share repurchase announcements.
(Insert Table 2 here)
Empirical evidence
Short-term share price performance
We are using the standard event study methodology to estimate the cumulative abnormal return (Insert Figure 1 here)
The next section examines whether and how some company and announcement characteristic affect the company repurchase decision and the market reaction. 
Share price performance related to company and repurchase characteristics
Various studies suggest that company characteristics affect the company repurchase activity as well as the investors' reaction. Dittmar (2000) argues that different firms proceed to buybacks for different reasons. Ikenberry et al. (1995 Ikenberry et al. ( , 2000 find that companies with higher book-tomarket ratio report higher long-term abnormal return after the announcement of SRP authorizations. Furthermore, the market reacts more favorably to buyback announcements of smaller companies. Cook et al. (2004) observe that larger firms repurchase after periods when the price of the stock underperforms the market.
We proceed with the examination of the company characteristics. In Panel B of Table 3 the announcements are grouped according to firm size and B/M ratio. The firm size is estimated as the market value of equity. Quartile rankings are computed using all listed firms on the day of the actual repurchases announcement. In Panel C of Table 3 the data are grouped according to announcement characteristics.
Following the methodology of Zhang (2005) When the announcements are frequent (either the distance between the announcements is less than three days or the number of announcements is greater than the median in the preceding quarter) the initial reaction is not statistically significant, which is somehow expected.
For the cases where the number of days since the previous announcement and the repurchase size are small, we observe negative abnormal reaction for the preceding period. The CAR(+2,+20) is not statistically significant. The results are in accordance the price support hypothesis. For the cases where the number of announcements is small in the quarter before the announcement the findings are consistent with the market timing hypothesis. For the cases where the repurchase size is high, the results support the signaling hypothesis. Akyol and Foo (2013) follow the methodology of Zhang (2005) with a slight variation.
For the calculation of the variables that assess the degree of "surprise", they impose a further restriction that the announcements are made under the same program. We use the modification of Akyol and Foo (2013) and re-estimate the abnormal returns. The results are similar. 
Share price performance related to the reason for program authorization
In Greece companies are required to announce the reason for initiating a SRP at the date of the program authorization. The most common reason for authorization, as stated by the companies, is stock undervaluation. For a great percentage of the programs, the reason is not explicitly stated (the company just states that the acquisitions will be conducted in accordance to the respective applicable laws). Few programs fall into a third category, with various causes of approval, for example, the cancellation of shares to reduce its share capital, sell-back to the market, distribution to employees or a combination of these reasons.
We follow the same classification to examine the market reaction to announcements of actual share repurchases. From Table 4 it appears that the short-term market reaction is greater when the firm-stated reason for authorizing a SRP is to support the stock price in case of undervaluation. When the reason is not explicitly stated, the CAR for the preceding period is negative, while the short-term CAR(+2, +20) is not statistically significant. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms repurchase in a contrarian fashion to stem the decline in its stock price. When the reason is very specific but other than supporting the stock price, it appears that the information is already incorporated in the share price and there is no statistically significant reaction.
(Insert Table 4 here)
Robustness test
During the period under examination some firms made only one share repurchase announcement.
Other firms repurchased almost daily while their SRP was in effect. In order to examine if the Mean CAR has been affected by the companies with the largest number of announcements, we 17 conduct the following test. We calculate the average cumulative abnormal return for each company separately and then carry out significance tests across firms. The results are presented in Table 5 and are similar to the results in Table 3 , Panel A.
(Insert Table 5 here.)
Factors affecting the market reaction
Cross-sectional regression analysis is used, to examine whether and to what extent some characteristics of companies and announcements affect the market reaction to actual share repurchase announcements. Following Zhang (2005), we regress the initial market reaction, CAR(0, +1), the immediate short-term reaction, CAR(+2, +10), and a month after the announcement, CAR(+2, +20), on firm and repurchase characteristics.
"CAR(−20,−1)" denotes the abnormal return for the month before the announcement.
"Firm size" is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. "B/M" is the book-to-marketvalue ratio, measured on the day of the announcement. "NDLR" is the number of days since last repurchase announcement and estimates the time between the announcement under consideration and the previous one, within a year. "NAP3M" is the number of announcements during preceding 3 months calculated by the announcements made within the last 90 days before the announcement under examination. "NTDA" is the number of trading days included in the announcement and reports the trading days that the firms acquired shares and are disclosed on the same day. "Repurchase size" is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding. We also include dummy variables for the three different groups of stated reasons for SRP authorization: price support in case of undervaluation, not specific reason and stated 18 reason other than price support. Since the coefficients of the dummy variables are not statistically significant in any case, they are not further reported.
(Insert Table 6 here.) Table 6 presents the statistical characteristics of the quantitative variables. Table 7 shows the results of three main regression models with the method of ordinary least squares (OLS). To ensure that our results are robust to the clustering problem, we use alternative techniques for estimating standard errors and found similar results. We calculate standard errors adapted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to Newey and West (1987) . Finally, we group the residuals in two dimensions, by company and by day, following the two-way technique proposed by Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) . The coefficients of the variables about the stated reasons for SRP authorizations are not statistically significant in any model.
(Insert Table 7 here)
From Table 7 we observe that the coefficient of the B/M ratio is positive, a finding that supports the theory of signaling. Also, investors reaction is positive when the number of announcements is smaller in the previous quarter and therefore the degree of surprise greater.
Interestingly, the coefficient of the abnormal performance in the period before the announcement is positive, but is statistically significant only in the period (+2, +10).
To The variables "NDLR" and "NAP3M" are determined based on Zhang's (2005) methodology. We also reconstruct the variables using the methodology of Akyol and Foo (2013) , who require that the previous announcements have been made within the same program. There is no difference between the results.
Conclusion
The paper Ginglinger and Hamon (2007); Akyol and Foo (2013) . The paper studies how the market conditions, and more specifically, the stock price trend and some basic company characteristics affect the decision to implement approved stock repurchase programs and the investors' reaction.
The sample includes the announcements of share buybacks from August 2005 to December 2010.
First, we examine when the companies choose to acquire their own shares and how the market reacts when it learns about such company actions. By studying the full set of announcements, we observe that companies engage in buybacks when the stock price exhibits a declining trend, and that the short-term market reaction is not statistically significant. The results are consistent with the price support hypothesis.
Next, we examine if some company and announcement characteristics affect the behavior of the companies and the investors. Smaller companies and companies with a higher book-tomarket ratio buyback shares without having observed significant fluctuations in the period preceding the buybacks. The short-term investor reaction is positive and statistically significant.
The larger companies and the companies with a lower book-to-market ratio proceed to buybacks 20 after periods in which the stock price in a declining course. After the share acquisitions, a price stabilization takes place. In short, for companies with stock more likely to be underpriced, the results favor the signaling undervaluation hypothesis. For the rest of the companies, the findings are consistent with the price support hypothesis. Mean CAR for the window (−20,+20). Day "0" on the horizontal axis is the date of the announcement of the actual share repurchases The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The number of announcements is 104, 576 and 146 for the first, second and third category of reason, respectively. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. N is the number of firms. "PW-CAAR" is the precision-weighted CAAR "Patell" is the Pattell serial test. "SCST" is the standardized cross-sectional test. "GST" is the generalized sign test. The CARs are measured against the market model. "B/M" is the book-to-market-value ratio measured on the announcement date. "Firm size" is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity on the announcement date. "NDLR" is the number of days since last repurchase announcement. "NAP3M" is the number of announcements during preceding 3 months. "NTDA" is the number of trading days included in the announcement. The CARs are measured against the market model. p-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. "B/M" is the book-to-market-value ratio. "Firm size" is measured by the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. "NDLR" is the number of days since last repurchase announcement. "NAP3M" is the number of announcements during preceding 3 months. "NTDA" is the number of trading days included in the announcement. CARs are measured against the market model.
